2014
The myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering.
Abstract: When something is wrong, someone is harmed. This hypothesis derives from the theory of dyadic morality, which suggests a moral cognitive template of wrongdoing agent and suffering patient (i.e., victim). This dyadic template means that victimless wrongs (e.g., masturbation) are psychologically incomplete, compelling the mind to perceive victims even when they are objectively absent. Five studies reveal that dyadic completion occurs automatically and implicitly: Ostensibly harmless wrongs are perceived to have …
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Cited by 315 publications
(347 citation statements)
References 180 publications
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“…We found no interaction between judgments of harmfulness and whether an act was self-directed versus dyadic. In other words, judgments of how harmful an act was predicted moral judgment to a similar extent for both self-directed and dyadic contexts, consistent with recent work suggesting that harm plays a primary role in moral judgments across domains [41,45]. Critically, however, we did observe a significant interaction between judgments of impurity and whether or not an act was self-directed.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 90%
“…We found no interaction between judgments of harmfulness and whether an act was self-directed versus dyadic. In other words, judgments of how harmful an act was predicted moral judgment to a similar extent for both self-directed and dyadic contexts, consistent with recent work suggesting that harm plays a primary role in moral judgments across domains [41,45]. Critically, however, we did observe a significant interaction between judgments of impurity and whether or not an act was self-directed.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 90%
“…In this study, there was no main effect of target group membership on moral judgement, such that the ingroup transgressor was only judged more harshly when the transgression was relationally framed. Theoretically, this finding is consistent with previous research by highlighting the importance of the interpersonal nature of moral judgements (e.g., Gray et al., 2014; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Tepe & Aydinli‐Karakulak, 2019) suggesting that differences in moral judgements are stronger when the relational components of a moral transgression are salient.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 91%
“…In line with moralization literature (Feinberg et al., 2019; Gray et al., 2014), we find that higher perception of risks is associated with higher moral relevance. Contrary to the existing literature and our predictions, we find that lower (not higher) perception of benefits is associated with higher moral relevance.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 91%
“…People who based their attitudes on the moral foundations of Harm, Purity, Authority, and Loyalty were also more moralized, which ties into moral judgment literature (e.g., Graham et al., 2011). In line with moralization literature (e.g., Gray et al., 2014), we find that overall higher perception of risks is associated with higher moral relevance. Overall, perception of benefits was negatively associated with moral relevance.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 90%
