2015
Why implicit attitudes are (probably) not beliefs
Abstract: Should we understand implicit attitudes on the model of belief? I argue that implicit attitudes are (probably) members of a different psychological kind altogether, because they seem to be insensitive to the logical form of an agent's thoughts and perceptions. A state is sensitive to logical form only if it is sensitive to the logical constituents of the content of other states (e.g., operators like negation and conditional). I explain sensitivity to logical form and argue that it is a necessary condition for …
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Cited by 136 publications
(43 citation statements)
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“…Taken together, the results emerging from the present studies are difficult to reconcile with several dual-process accounts that have dominated theorizing about implicit evaluation both in social cognition research (Evans, 2003;Gawronski & Strack, 2004;Lieberman et al, 2002;Sloman, 1996;Smith & DeCoster, 2000;Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and in philosophy (Gendler, 2008;Madva, 2016). Specifically, these theories posit that implicit evaluations should uniquely reflect the effects of co-occurrence information, without any modulation by high-level inferential reasoning.…”
Section: Theoretical Implicationscontrasting
confidence: 73%
“…Taken together, the results emerging from the present studies are difficult to reconcile with several dual-process accounts that have dominated theorizing about implicit evaluation both in social cognition research (Evans, 2003;Gawronski & Strack, 2004;Lieberman et al, 2002;Sloman, 1996;Smith & DeCoster, 2000;Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and in philosophy (Gendler, 2008;Madva, 2016). Specifically, these theories posit that implicit evaluations should uniquely reflect the effects of co-occurrence information, without any modulation by high-level inferential reasoning.…”
Section: Theoretical Implicationscontrasting
confidence: 73%
“…10 As I stated in footnote 3, I am not wanting to commit to any particular view of what implicit biases are. To name a popular accounts, it has been argued that implicit biases are associations (Madva, 2016;Madva & Brownstein, 2016), propositional attitudes (Egan, 2008;Mandelbaum, 2016;Schwitzgebel, 2010), and aliefs (Gendler, 2011). However, my claim here that patterns of nonverbal behavior reflect and reinforce implicit biases is largely orthogonal to these metaphysical debates.…”
Section: Cognitive Architecture: Implicit and Explicit Biasmentioning
confidence: 74%
“……”
Section: Attitudes and Intentionsmentioning
confidence: 84%
