2015
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0874-2
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Why implicit attitudes are (probably) not beliefs

Abstract: Should we understand implicit attitudes on the model of belief? I argue that implicit attitudes are (probably) members of a different psychological kind altogether, because they seem to be insensitive to the logical form of an agent's thoughts and perceptions. A state is sensitive to logical form only if it is sensitive to the logical constituents of the content of other states (e.g., operators like negation and conditional). I explain sensitivity to logical form and argue that it is a necessary condition for … Show more

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Cited by 136 publications

(43 citation statements)
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“…Taken together, the results emerging from the present studies are difficult to reconcile with several dual-process accounts that have dominated theorizing about implicit evaluation both in social cognition research (Evans, 2003;Gawronski & Strack, 2004;Lieberman et al, 2002;Sloman, 1996;Smith & DeCoster, 2000;Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and in philosophy (Gendler, 2008;Madva, 2016). Specifically, these theories posit that implicit evaluations should uniquely reflect the effects of co-occurrence information, without any modulation by high-level inferential reasoning.…”
Section: Theoretical Implicationscontrasting
confidence: 73%
Exaggerated anticipatory anxiety is common in social anxiety disorder (SAD). Neuroimaging studies have revealed altered neural activity in response to social stimuli in SAD, but fewer studies have examined neural activity during anticipation of feared social stimuli in SAD. The current study examined the time course and magnitude of activity in threat processing brain regions during speech anticipation in socially anxious individuals and healthy controls (HC). Method Participants (SAD n = 58; HC n = 16) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during which they completed a 90s control anticipation task and 90s speech anticipation task.
“…Taken together, the results emerging from the present studies are difficult to reconcile with several dual-process accounts that have dominated theorizing about implicit evaluation both in social cognition research (Evans, 2003;Gawronski & Strack, 2004;Lieberman et al, 2002;Sloman, 1996;Smith & DeCoster, 2000;Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and in philosophy (Gendler, 2008;Madva, 2016). Specifically, these theories posit that implicit evaluations should uniquely reflect the effects of co-occurrence information, without any modulation by high-level inferential reasoning.…”
Section: Theoretical Implicationscontrasting
confidence: 73%
Exaggerated anticipatory anxiety is common in social anxiety disorder (SAD). Neuroimaging studies have revealed altered neural activity in response to social stimuli in SAD, but fewer studies have examined neural activity during anticipation of feared social stimuli in SAD. The current study examined the time course and magnitude of activity in threat processing brain regions during speech anticipation in socially anxious individuals and healthy controls (HC). Method Participants (SAD n = 58; HC n = 16) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during which they completed a 90s control anticipation task and 90s speech anticipation task.
“…10 As I stated in footnote 3, I am not wanting to commit to any particular view of what implicit biases are. To name a popular accounts, it has been argued that implicit biases are associations (Madva, 2016;Madva & Brownstein, 2016), propositional attitudes (Egan, 2008;Mandelbaum, 2016;Schwitzgebel, 2010), and aliefs (Gendler, 2011). However, my claim here that patterns of nonverbal behavior reflect and reinforce implicit biases is largely orthogonal to these metaphysical debates.…”
Section: Cognitive Architecture: Implicit and Explicit Biasmentioning
confidence: 74%
Exaggerated anticipatory anxiety is common in social anxiety disorder (SAD). Neuroimaging studies have revealed altered neural activity in response to social stimuli in SAD, but fewer studies have examined neural activity during anticipation of feared social stimuli in SAD. The current study examined the time course and magnitude of activity in threat processing brain regions during speech anticipation in socially anxious individuals and healthy controls (HC). Method Participants (SAD n = 58; HC n = 16) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during which they completed a 90s control anticipation task and 90s speech anticipation task.
“……”
Section: Attitudes and Intentionsmentioning
confidence: 84%
Exaggerated anticipatory anxiety is common in social anxiety disorder (SAD). Neuroimaging studies have revealed altered neural activity in response to social stimuli in SAD, but fewer studies have examined neural activity during anticipation of feared social stimuli in SAD. The current study examined the time course and magnitude of activity in threat processing brain regions during speech anticipation in socially anxious individuals and healthy controls (HC). Method Participants (SAD n = 58; HC n = 16) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during which they completed a 90s control anticipation task and 90s speech anticipation task.